theft

Safe: The developer's machine was compromised, leading to the theft of Bybit; there are no vulnerabilities in the contract and frontend code

ChainCatcher news, Safe responded on platform X to Bybit's hacking forensic report, stating that the forensic review of the targeted attack by the Lazarus Group on Bybit concluded that the attack on Bybit Safe was executed through compromised Safe{Wallet} developer machines, leading to disguised malicious transactions.Lazarus is a government-backed North Korean hacking organization known for its complex social engineering attacks on developer credentials, sometimes combined with zero-day vulnerabilities. The forensic review by external security researchers did not indicate any vulnerabilities in the Safe smart contracts or the source code of the front end and services.Following the recent incident, the Safe{Wallet} team conducted a thorough investigation and has now phased the restoration of Safe{Wallet} on the Ethereum mainnet. The Safe{Wallet} team has completely rebuilt and reconfigured all infrastructure and rotated all credentials to ensure the complete elimination of the attack vector.After the final results of the investigation are released, the Safe{Wallet} team will publish a complete post-mortem analysis. The Safe{Wallet} front end is still operational and has implemented additional security measures. However, users need to be extra cautious and vigilant when signing transactions.

Slow Fog: If Bybit upgrades the Safe contract to version 1.3.0 or higher and implements an appropriate Guard mechanism, it may avoid the theft of 1.5 billion dollars in assets

ChainCatcher message, Slow Mist stated that on February 21, 2025, Bybit's on-chain multi-signature wallet was targeted and breached, with nearly $1.5 billion in assets quietly lost through a transaction with a "legitimate signature." Subsequent on-chain analysis revealed that the attacker gained multi-signature permissions through sophisticated social engineering attacks, implanted malicious logic using the delegatecall function of the Safe contract, and ultimately bypassed the multi-signature verification mechanism to transfer funds to an anonymous address. "Multi-signature" does not equal "absolute security"; even a secure mechanism like the Safe multi-signature wallet can still be at risk of being compromised if lacking additional protective measures.Bybit is using version v1.1.1 (<1.3.0) of the Safe contract, which means they cannot utilize the Guard mechanism, a key security feature. If Bybit had upgraded to version 1.3.0 or higher of the Safe contract and implemented an appropriate Guard mechanism, such as specifying a whitelist address for receiving funds and conducting strict contract function ACL verification, they might have been able to avoid this loss. Although this is merely a hypothesis, it provides important insights for future asset security management.

Slow Fog Cosine: Confirmed that the attacker of the CEX theft incident is the North Korean hacker group Lazarus Group, which has revealed its attack methods

ChainCatcher news, Slow Mist founder Yu Xian posted on social media, "Through forensic analysis and correlation tracking, we confirm that the attackers of the CEX theft incident are the North Korean hacker group Lazarus Group. This is a nation-state APT attack targeting cryptocurrency trading platforms. We have decided to share the relevant IOCs (Indicators of Compromise), which include some IPs of cloud service providers, proxies, etc. It is important to note that this disclosure does not specify which platform or platforms were involved, nor does it mention Bybit; if there are similarities, it is indeed not impossible."The attackers utilized pyyaml for RCE (Remote Code Execution), enabling the delivery of malicious code to control target computers and servers. This method bypassed most antivirus software. After synchronizing intelligence with partners, multiple similar malicious samples were obtained. The main goal of the attackers is to gain control over wallets by infiltrating the infrastructure of cryptocurrency trading platforms, thereby illegally transferring a large amount of cryptocurrency assets from the wallets.Slow Mist published a summary article revealing the attack methods of the Lazarus Group, and also analyzed their use of social engineering, vulnerability exploitation, privilege escalation, internal network penetration, and fund transfer tactics. At the same time, based on actual cases, they summarized defense recommendations against APT attacks, hoping to provide references for the industry and help more institutions enhance their security capabilities and reduce the impact of potential threats.
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