Security

Hyperliquid co-founder responds to concerns about agreement security: Leveraging system and HLP liquidation mechanism have been updated

ChainCatcher message, Hyperliquid co-founder @chameleon_jeff responded on X to concerns that "the Hyperliquid protocol may suffer significant losses due to market manipulation":Hyperliquid's margin design strictly ensures the platform's solvency through mathematical mechanisms, with HLP's losses always limited to its own treasury, and the protocol's operation never relying on HLP------this feature existed prior to the JELLYJELLY incident. The newly added protective mechanisms after the incident only optimize HLP's loss resistance in backup liquidation, and the underlying architecture of the protocol has not changed. In the recent JELLYJELLY incident, an attacker attempted to manipulate HLP (liquidity provider pool) by establishing a massive long and short position on themselves. Although the unliquidated contract limit at that time allowed for the establishment of a position worth 4 million USDC, the logical flaw was that HLP used its entire fund balance as collateral for this liquidation. It should be clarified that the platform itself does not face solvency risks, but HLP did face excessive risk exposure due to market manipulation.Currently, HLP's liquidation component treasury has set a collateral limit, restricting potential losses through the backup liquidation mechanism. Hyperliquid still maintains its original operating mechanism, processing under-collateralized positions in the following order: 1) market liquidation 2) backup liquidation 3) automatic deleveraging (ADL). The current backup liquidation of HLP has added protective mechanisms by setting loss limits, making the cost of manipulating the mark price far exceed the limited gains that can be obtained from HLP.

Vitalik proposed the "L2 Security and Finality Roadmap," highlighting the three core directions of Ethereum L2

ChainCatcher news, Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin published a long article titled "A simple L2 security and finalization roadmap," which outlines three core directions for optimizing Ethereum L2 security and finality:Expand data capacity: Increase the Blob space to 6 through the Pectra upgrade, and expand it to 72 (or gradually increase to 12-24) in the upcoming Fusaka upgrade at the end of the year, to meet the L2 transaction throughput demands;Implement a hybrid proof system for rapid finality: Use a 2/3 multi-signature mechanism (optimistic proof + ZK proof + TEE trusted hardware proof). If ZK and TEE verify simultaneously, finality is immediate; if only one is verified, it requires a 7-day optimistic challenge period. The security committee can urgently upgrade the proof logic but is subject to a 30-day delay, balancing immediate finality with attack resistance;Build a unified ZK proof aggregation layer: Standardize the proof aggregation protocol across the ecosystem, allowing multiple applications to share the cost of a single proof (e.g., 500,000 Gas), significantly reducing ZK verification overhead and promoting the adoption of L2, privacy protocols, and other scenarios. The goal of this roadmap is to achieve L2 cross-chain bridging finality within 1 hour and reduce costs through short-term hybrid verification mechanisms, while gradually eliminating TEE reliance with a long-term goal of full ZK implementation, ultimately establishing an efficient, secure, and trustless L2 ecosystem.
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