MBUS

Jingde Court has concluded a case involving a pyramid scheme related to virtual currency, with an amount involved of approximately 6.39 million yuan

ChainCatcher news, according to the official WeChat account of Jingde County People's Court, the Jingde Court recently concluded a case involving the organization and leadership of pyramid selling activities related to virtual currency.It is reported that Xu (handled in another case) planned to develop the "Mobius" project, which involved issuing and promoting MBUS (Mobius) virtual currency, cards, etc. Several individuals required participants to purchase and hold MBUS coins, NFT cards, and MSS coins under the guise of investing in virtual currency and derivative project trading. They actively developed downline personnel through "referral" methods and organized a hierarchical structure in a certain order, directly or indirectly using the number of developed personnel, the amount and quantity of purchased virtual currency and cards as the basis for compensation or rebates, defrauding participants of a total of over 964,300 USDT (1 USDT is approximately equal to 1 USD, equivalent to about 6.39 million RMB).After the incident, it was identified that the wallet addresses of MBUS coin holders recorded 29,280 entries, with a total referral hierarchy of 48 levels. The individuals involved, including Li, Xiang, Huang, and four others, were sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment ranging from two to three years, with probation and fines imposed.

Slow Fog: NimbusPlatform was attacked, and the attackers profited approximately 278 BNB

ChainCatcher news, according to the Slow Mist security team's intelligence, the project NimbusPlatform on the BNB Chain was attacked, with the attacker profiting approximately 278 BNB.The attack process is as follows:The attacker first executed a transaction 8 days ago (0x7d2d8d), exchanging 20 BNB for NBU_WBNB and then for GNIMB tokens, and subsequently transferred the GNIMB tokens into the Staking contract as collateral, preparing for the attack.After 8 days, the attacker officially initiated the attack transaction (0x42f56d3), first borrowing 75,477 BNB through a flash loan and exchanging it for NBU_WBNB, then using these NBU_WBNB tokens to redeem the vast majority of NIMB tokens from the pool.Next, the attacker called the getReward function of the Staking contract to extract rewards. The calculation of rewards is positively correlated with the value of the rate, which depends on the prices of NIMB and GNIMB tokens in the pool. Since the price of NIMB tokens is calculated based on the quantity of tokens in the pool manipulated by the previous flash loan, it results in a higher price due to the large amount of tokens exchanged in the flash loan, leading to a greater calculated reward.Finally, the attacker exchanged the GNIMB tokens obtained and the NIMB tokens held for NBU_WBNB tokens and then converted them back to BNB, repaying the flash loan profitably. The main reason for this attack lies in the fact that the reward calculation solely depends on the quantity of tokens in the pool, which was manipulated by the flash loan, resulting in rewards exceeding expectations. The Slow Mist security team suggests ensuring the security of price sources when calculating token rewards.
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