From North Korean Hackers to Multi-Signature Wallet Crises: The Security Offensive and Defensive Battle of the DeFi Ecosystem
Author: HotWater
In the context of the rapid rise of decentralized finance (DeFi), projects like Gnosis, Safe, and Cow have long been renowned as "OG-level" projects within the Ethereum ecosystem. They manage vast asset treasuries, often holding hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars in Bitcoin and Ethereum reserves, making them both a focal point of the industry and potential targets for hackers. Recently, there have been Twitter reports suggesting that Gnosis/Safe may be facing a potential "storm" with exchanges or service providers like Bybit, hinting at security risks associated with North Korean hacker groups, which has garnered widespread attention in the community.
1. The History and Status of Safe (Gnosis Safe)
Safe (formerly Gnosis Safe) is a highly representative multi-signature asset management tool in the development of the Gnosis ecosystem. The Gnosis project initially focused on prediction markets and gradually extended to secure custody, asset management, and other services. The core idea of Safe is that for organizations or individuals holding substantial digital assets, relying solely on a single private key is not secure; it is essential to depend on multi-signature or smart contract preset rules to better prevent internal fraud or external attacks.
For this reason, Safe is widely used in the Ethereum and cross-chain ecosystems: many DAOs, foundations, and large NFT projects regard it as a "vault"-style underlying custody solution. It is not only an "established" tool but has also integrated into various decentralized application scenarios and spawned multiple extended functions (such as social recovery, hardware wallet support, etc.). This core position makes Safe a "treasury" in the eyes of hackers.
2. Potential Infiltration by North Korean Hacker Groups
North Korean hacker groups (most notably the "Lazarus" group) have been repeatedly reported in connection with cross-border money laundering, banking system attacks, and exchange thefts in recent years. They often employ sophisticated methods and operate covertly, adept at infiltrating target systems through social engineering, phishing emails, and exploiting contract vulnerabilities. For them, the openness of the DeFi world and cross-chain liquidity actually becomes an advantage: once a breakthrough is found, they can quickly transfer funds across multiple chains and then mix the coins, significantly increasing the difficulty of tracking.
In major financial centers in Asia, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Tokyo, there have been ongoing rumors of "North Korean agents disguising themselves as ordinary job seekers or investment consultants, attempting to establish contact with project executives." Once these "undercover agents" gain the trust of the core team or key permissions, they could directly manipulate the multi-signature process of smart contracts or steal private key information, leading to severe asset losses.
3. Multiple Security Risks in Web3
1. Technical Aspects
Decentralized applications are emerging one after another, but security audits and protective systems often cannot keep pace with the speed of innovation. While multi-signature is an important method for enhancing security, it may also have vulnerabilities in contracts, errors in the signing process, or improper internal permission management. If a foundational multi-signature tool like Safe is compromised, almost all DAOs and projects relying on it for asset management will face severe blows.
2. Partner Aspects
The DeFi ecosystem is interwoven: a DAO may collaborate with multiple exchanges, custody services, and cross-chain protocols, and may also share liquidity or conduct token swaps with other projects. This means that any oversight in security review by any party could open a gap for hackers. For instance, some "partners" disguised as third-party service providers may actually be manipulated by North Korean hackers, and once they gain internal system access, it could lead to a chain reaction.
3. Social Engineering and Human Weaknesses
Like traditional financial crimes, hacker organizations still most commonly use "social engineering"—whether through phishing emails or "beautiful women dropping in," as long as they can gain the trust of key team members or system access, they can instantly turn all technical barriers into nothing. In a globalized, remote-collaborative Web3 environment, people are more likely to overlook the necessity of identity verification and background checks.
4. If an Attack Occurs, What Are the Impacts?
- Financial Loss: The treasury managed in Safe is extremely large; if a major attack occurs, tens of millions of dollars or more in assets could be stolen.
- Market Confidence: If a fatal flaw appears in the multi-signature system, user confidence in the security of DeFi will inevitably be greatly diminished, potentially triggering panic withdrawals or sell-offs, causing price fluctuations and market turmoil.
- Regulatory Intervention: Major hacking incidents often attract the attention of regulatory agencies in various countries, accelerating the compliance and control processes for the crypto industry. Sanctions against North Korean-related forces will also escalate, further affecting the cross-border operations of more exchanges and projects.
- Industry Ecosystem: If a leading project or infrastructure (like Safe) falls, related parties will be forced to seek alternative solutions or respond urgently, and the compatibility and collaboration between DeFi protocols may also be impacted.
5. Response and Prevention: Multi-Party Collaboration
- Technical Upgrades
- Strengthen smart contract audits, covering multiple dimensions such as multi-signature contracts, cross-chain bridges, and application layer protocols.
- Explore new technologies like zero-knowledge proofs and hardware signatures to add more firewalls to the multi-signature process.
- Team and Community Management
- Conduct strict KYC and background checks on partners, outsourcing teams, and consultants to eliminate potential "spies" or "agents."
- Implement the principle of least privilege within the team to avoid any individual or single department holding excessive permissions.
- Continuous Monitoring and Emergency Plans
- Deploy real-time monitoring systems that immediately trigger risk control mechanisms or community voting upon detecting abnormal transfers or large authorizations.
- Establish emergency multi-signature withdrawal or freezing functions to prevent assets from being transferred entirely within seconds.
- Collaboration with Cross-Chain and Exchanges
- Exchanges, cross-chain bridges, and custody institutions should establish rapid response mechanisms to promptly freeze or mark suspicious addresses, preventing hackers from transferring assets and "getting away with it."
- The industry could establish alliances for information sharing and blacklist management regarding malicious contract addresses and potential threat entities.
6. Conclusion
The reason projects like Gnosis, Safe, and Cow have become focal points in the industry is not only due to their technical strength and vast assets but also because they represent the core values of decentralization, autonomy, and innovation in the Web3 era. The potential infiltration by North Korean hacker groups warns us that behind openness and freedom, there is still a need to establish a strong security defense. Whether in technology, governance, or compliance, there should be more rigorous deployments and collaborations.
This game of "DeFi versus sovereign state hackers" has only just begun. To truly safeguard the future of Web3, projects like Safe not only need to maintain technological leadership and security audits but also must collaborate closely with the community, exchanges, and regulatory agencies to establish an effective global security mechanism. Only in this way can decentralized finance truly progress steadily and allow all participants to confidently explore and expand in this emerging "digital continent."